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REAL ESTATE VENTURES
THE REAL ESTATE VENTURE AS A TAX SHELTER
GLEN B. HARDYMONt
The favorable economic conditions which have existed for the past
several years and continued high federal and state income taxes have
caused an increasing number of high-income taxpayers to seek out "tax
shelter" investments.' As a result there has been a proliferation of pub-
licly and privately offered real estate, timber, 2 cattle and farming opera-
tions,3 oil and gas,' cable television, and equipment-leasing 5 invest-
ments, all geared toward generating the largest paper tax loss possible
for the investors and yet holding out the promise of capital gains upon
ultimate disposition of the property.
Because the tax shelter concept is often misunderstood, a simple
example would appear helpful:6 Taxpayer, Dr. A, has earnings in 1971
from his profession totaling 100,000 dollars, personal deductions of
20,000 dollars, and a potential tax liability of 33,340 dollars. Along with
other similarly situated taxpayers, A invests 30,000 dollars in February,
1971, in a real estate tax shelter. The real estate project is a 136-unit
apartment complex and costs the investor group 2,200,00 dollars, of
which 500,000 dollars was to be paid in cash with the balance repre-
sented by a nonrecourse mortgage. The apartment project was com-
pleted in September, 1971, and for the remainder of the year generated
12,500 dollars of net cash flow. However, through various means, in-
cluding a wrap-around mortgage7 and prepaid interest expense, the pro-
ject showed a tax loss in 1971 of 350,000 dollars. A's share of the cash
tMember, Mecklenburg County Bar.
"A [tax] shelter is a tax preference provided by Congress. A [tax] gimmick is simply a shelter
which Congress did not foresee. Both are to be distinguished from a loophole, which is an unin-
tended shelter." Tax Shelter for the Individual: A Panel Discussion, N.Y.U. 28TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1009 (1970).
2See, e.g., Georges, Timber as a tax shelter: What are the benefits and are there drawbacks?,
36 J. TAX. 364 (1972).
3See, e.g., Durham, Farms and Farming: Gentlemen Farmers, New Hobby Loss Rules;
Holding Period; Etc., N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1527 (1971).
4See, e.g., Romak, Natural Resources Including Oil and Gas; Timber: Who and How, the
Economics, the Risks and the 1969 Act, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1569 (1971).
5See, e.g., Goldstein, Equipment Leasing After the 1969 Act, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1589 (1971).
'The example is based upon an actual syndicated real estate project, but may not necessarily
be representative of all offerings available in the field.
7See note 106 infra; text accompanying note 105 infra.
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flow amounts to 750 dollars, his investment credit was 250 dollars, and
his share of the loss amounts to 22,000 dollars. For 1972, A's projected
share of cash flow is 2,400 dollars plus losses of 12,000 dollars. Dr. A's
share of the project loss for 1971 of 22,000 dollars would be available
to offset his income from his profession and, along with the investment
credit, would reduce his tax liability to 20,790 dollars. This would result
in a net tax saving to the taxpayer of 12,500 dollars. In addition, the
750 dollar cash flow would be received tax-free.
The sheltering of the investor's income is the primary characteristic
of the tax shelter. However, many tax shelter investments, particularly
the real estate venture, offer the additional benefit of cash-flow distribu-
tions to the investors, which are distributed to the investors tax-free
when they do not exceed losses. In the example, Dr. A's anticipated
share of cash flow for 1972 is 2,400 dollars, all of which would be tax-
free and would be in addition to his anticipated direct tax savings of
approximately 6,000 dollars through deduction of his share of the losses.
From the investor's standpoint, return on an investment in a tax
shelter is measured by three factors: (1) the tax loss that is passed
through to him as an individual investor and that is available to offset
other income; (2) cash flow which is distributed to him tax-free; and (3)
the amount of gain which will be realized upon ultimate sale of the
investment.8 Obviously, the higher the individual investor's tax bracket,
the greater are the benefits to be derived from this type of investment.
While the Tax Reform Act of 1969 has imposed a fifty-percent limit on
taxation of earned income, this limitation is not applicable to invest-
ment income Thus, effective tax brackets in excess of fifty percent will
continue to be common for taxpayers who have substantial investment
income.
Of the many different types of tax shelter investments currently
available to high bracket taxpayers, the one most commonly encoun-
tered by attorneys in North Carolina is the real estate partnership.
While the basic rules for structuring a real estate tax shelter have crys-
talized, there are still many pitfalls which can trap the unwary investor.
'rhere are other nontax attributes which are important to the prospective investor or a real
estate limited partnership. Among the most important of the nontax factors are the extent of
exposure to personal liability or financial loss and the degree to which continued professional
management of the real estate project will be provided. In many instances these factors may
override one or more tax considerations.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1348(b)(1).
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The purpose of this article is to highlight those areas of the tax law
which are most important in determining whether a particular real es-
tate tax shelter will produce the expected tax benefits to the investors.
SELECTION OF OWNERSHIP VEHICLE
The determination of the owning entity in any tax shelter is critical.
Since the primary objective of the tax shelter is to allow a flow-through
of losses and other tax incidents to the individual investors and to avoid
the possibility of tax at both the entity level and the investor level, the
choice of entity is in most instances reduced to some form of partnership
agreement.
The corporation offers limited liability to the investors but is gener-
ally not suitable as a tax shelter. The Subchapter C corporation 0 pays
income tax at the corporate level on its earnings and profits. Any losses
generated by the real estate investment in the corporation would be
available only to offset current corporate earnings, or as carry-backs or
carry-forwards to offset current corporate earnings, or as carry-backs
or carry-forwards to offset other income of the corporation in prior or
subsequent years. Distributions of income by the corporation would be
out of the after-tax dollars and would be subject to additional taxation
at the shareholder-investor level.
Sections 1371 to 1379 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Sub-
chapter S) provide an election whereby certain corporations and their
shareholders may elect to be taxed as a small business corporation.
These provisions, in simplified form, provide that the corporate income
will be taxed directly to the shareholder (with the exception of capital
gains in certain situations)1 and that the losses of the corporation will
be deductible at the shareholder level up to the extent of the sharehold-
ers' investment in the corporation. 2 However, the availability of the
Subchapter S corporation in the tax shelter area is severely restricted
by the limitations imposed on passive income. Section 1372(e)(5)(A) of
the Code provides that a Subchapter S corporation cannot have more
than twenty percent of its gross income represented by passive income.
The term "passive income" is defined as gross receipts from royalties,
rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301-95.
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1378.
MINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374(c).
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securities."3 The operation of a real estate project such as an apartment
or office building generally cannot qualify for Subchapter S treatment
due to the "passive" nature of the rents." Furthermore, under Subchap-
ter S, losses can be utilized at the shareholder level only to the extent
of funds actually invested by the shareholder in the corporation.' Since
many highly leveraged real estate projects will generate losses in excess
of cash invested, the use of a Subchapter S corporation may result in
the loss of su1dstantial deductions.
A partnership will usually best fulfill the objectives of the investors.
The partnership, unlike the corporation, is not a taxable entity," but is
instead a conduit through which income tax attributes of the enterprise
are passed to the individual partners. While a general partnership may
be utilized in certain special circumstances as the owning entity, in most
instances the investors are unwilling to be exposed to the liability which
is entailed in participation in a general partnership. Because of the
unlimited liability of all partners in a general partnership, a properly
structured limited partnership is believed to best fulfill the objectives of
the investor seeking a real estate tax shelter.
THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
The limited partnership, a statutorily created entity, is simply a
partnership with two classes of partners: at least one general partner and
any number of limited partners. 7 The limited partners under the statute
enjoy the unique position of not being liable for the obligations of the
limited partnership in excess of their capital contribution to the limited
partnership. The basic nontax characteristics of a limited partnership
may be summarized as follows.
A limited partner is not liable to the creditors of the partnership
in excess of his agreed contribution to the limited partnership unless, in
addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as granted to him in
'
3Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5) (1959).
"It is understood, however, that some rulings have been issued by the Internal Revenue Service
approving a Subchapter S election in the case of a corporation owning and operating shopping
centers and related type real property investments. The apparent key to such rulings has been the
providing of substantial service by the managing corporation.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1374.
"INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 701.
"
7 UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 1.
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the agreement of limited partnership, he takes part in the active control
and management of the partnership's business and affairs."
The general partner is responsible for the management and control
of the business except to the extent limited partners are granted certain
voting privileges in the agreement of limited partnership.19
A limited partner's interest in the limited partnership is personal
property and may or may not be assignable depending upon the terms
of the limited partnership agreement. In most instances, because of
certain federal income tax regulations, °2 a limited partner is permitted
to assign only his interest in the earnings and profits of the limited
partnership, but such assignee does not become a substitute limited
partner .2
The death, retirement, bankruptcy, or withdrawal of the general
partner generally dissolves the limited partnership. However, the agree-
ment of limited partnership may contain provisions for the continuation
of the partnership by a newly designated general partner.22
The death of a limited partner does not affect the existence of the
limited partnership. 3
THE ASSOCIATION-PARTNERSHIP CONCEPT
The use of the limited partnership as the owning entity in a real
estate tax shelter may raise the question of whether the limited partner-
ship will be treated as a partnership for tax purposes or will be consid-
ered an "association," which is taxable as a corporation.
For purposes of federal income taxation the term "corporation" is
defined to include associations and joint stock companies.2 1 Conse-
quently, an unincorporated organization such as a limited partnership
may be treated under the income tax regulations as a corporation if it
is found to have more corporate characteristics than noncorporate char-
acteristics. The regulations list six major characteristics ordinarily
found in a corporation: (a) associates; (b) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom; (c) centralization of manage-
'8Jd. §§ 1, 7.
19d. § 9.
20Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1960).
21UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 19.
22d. § 20(a).
-1d. § 21.
2 NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 770(a)(3). See also Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935).
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ment; (d) continuity of life; (e) free transferability of interests; and (I
limited liability. 5
A limited partnership" will not be classified as an association and
taxed as a corporation unless it has more corporate than noncorporate
characteristics. Characteristics common to both a limited partnership
and a corporation will not, however, be considered. Thus, though a
limited partnership has associates and an objective to carry on business
and divide gains therefrom, these characteristics are not considered
because they are common to both corporations and partnerships .2 A
mathematical test is applied to the four remaining characteristics of
centralization of management, continuity of life, free transferability,
and limited liability: if the limited partnership possesses three or more
of the four characteristics, it will be taxed as a corporation.28 The deter-
mination of whether the limited partnership will be treated as a partner-
ship for tax purposes is thus basically a factual question and requires a
careful examination of the limited partnership agreement.
Centralization of management exists when there is a "concentra-
tion of continuing exclusive authority to make independent business
decisions on behalf of the organization which do not require ratification
by members of such organizations."2 A limited partnership organized
under a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
generally does not have centralized management." However, the regu-
lations caution that centralized management ordinarily does exist in
such a limited partnership if substantially all the interests in the partner-
ship are owned by the limited partners. 1 While the centralized manage-
ment concept should not be a problem in the ordinary limited partner-
ship organized under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, this ques-
tion must be given careful consideration in a real estate syndicate in
which the general-partner developer retains only a nominal interest in
the limited partnership and the balance is sold to the limited-partner
2Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
6The rules applicable to classification of a limited partnership, for tax purposes, as a partner-
ship, as opposed to an association, are equally applicable to general partnerships, joint ventures
and similar unincorporated associations.
27Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
28d.
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).




investors. In such a situation the limited partnership will be considered
to have centralized management.3 2
A limited partnership is considered to have continuity of life if the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any
member will not cause a dissolution of the organization.33 Conversely,
continuity of life does not exist if the retirement, death, insanity, with-
drawal, or bankruptcy of the general partner causes an automatic disso-
lution of the limited partnership unless the remaining general partners
or limited partners agree to continue the partnership or designate a
substitute general partner. 4 Because of the provisions of the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act providing for dissolution on the death, with-
drawal, bankruptcy, etc., of the general. partner, 5 the regulations con-
clude that a limited partnership subject to a statute patterned after the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act lacks continuity of life since a mem-
ber of the limited partnership, the general partner, has under local law
the power to dissolve the organization.3 1 In the typical real estate part-
nership, however, the limited-partner investors will want some assur-
ance that the limited partnership will continue even after the death,
disability, etc., of the general partner. What provisions can then be
incorporated in the limited partnership agreement to assure continua-
tion of the venture even upon the death of the general partner without
creating the continuity of interest condemned by the regulations?
It is clear that the limited partnership agreement can provide that
the remaining general and limited partners may elect to continue the
partnership and the partnership will not be considered to have the corpo-
rate characteristic of unlimited life.37 It would also appear to be permis-
sible to provide that when all general partners die, withdraw, etc., the
remaining limited partners may elect to designate a new general partner
and continue the venture. While the draftsman of a limited partnership
agreement has considerable leeway in avoiding the continuity-of-life
characteristics, it should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service
takes the position that a limited partnership with a fixed life possesses
continuity of life since it continues for a fixed period of time, even
321d.
33Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
3Id.
'UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 20.
3Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1960).
3'Rev. Rul. 54-484, 1954-2 Cum. BULL. 242.
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though not an unlimited period of time, if, under applicable local law,
no member has the power prior to such date to dissolve the organiza-
tion.3 1
The corporate characteristic of free transferability of interest exists
if each partner, or those partners owning substantially all of the interest
in the limited partnership, have the power, without the consent of other
partners, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a person
who is not a partner of the limited partnership." There is no free
transferability of interest, however, if, under local law, a transfer of a
member's interest results in the dissolution of the old organization and
the formation of a new organization." Restricting free transferability
may not be desirable from an investor standpoint and is one of the
greatest disadvantages to doing business in the limited partnership form.
Fortunately, there are several alternatives available to the careful drafts-
man to avoid some of the impact of this limitation. For example, the
limited partnership agreement may provide that an individual limited
partner may transfer only his interests in the profits and losses of the
limited partnership to a third party but, such third party will not become
a "substituted limited partner" unless the general partner consents. This
has the effect of permitting each individual investor some freedom to
dispose of his interest yet does not create the corporate characteristic
of free transferability. However, it should be noted that the assignee of
a limited pariner's interest in the profits and losses is not entitled to any
of the special rights afforded a limited partner, such as the right to
inspect the books and records of the limited partnership.4
At one time the imposition of a right of first refusal in the general
partner to purchase a limited partner's interest was thought sufficient
to eliminate the free transferability characteristics. However, the regula-
tions classify this as a modified form of free transferability." In recent
years there has been an attempt to avoid this corporate attribute by
prohibiting all transfers to a substituted limited partner but making an
exception in the case of the limited partner's spouse, his estate, and
other members of his immediate family. It is understood that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service also views this as a limited form of transferability
uTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(g), example (5) (1960).
3
rFreas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
4d.
"UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 19(3).
4Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(2) (1960).
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which can be sufficient to cause the limited partnership to be taxed as a
corporation, if other corporate attributes are present.
A limited partnership is considered to have the corporate charac-
teristic of limited liability if under local law there is no member of the
limited partnership who is personally liable for the debts of or claims
against the organization."3 In the case of a limited partnership organ-
ized under a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, personal liability exists with respect to each general partner and
thus the corporate characteristic of limited liability is avoided." The
regulations, however, contain a caveat that the limited liability charac-
teristic will be deemed to exist in a limited partnership if the general
partner, whether an individual or a corporation, has no substantial as-
sets (other than his interest in the partnership) which can be reached by
a creditor of the organization and is merely a dummy acting as the agent
of the limited partners.45
THE CORPORATE GENERAL PARTNER
The provisions requiring a substantial worth in both the individual
and corporate general partner have probably caused more concern in
recent years than any other aspect of the association-partnership prob-
lem.
While the limited partnership fulfills the objectives of limited liabil-
ity insofar as the limited partner is concerned, the general partner, often
the developer or syndicator of the project, would also like to be afforded
similar treatment. The most obvious means of avoiding personal liabil-
ity in the general partner and yet retaining the favorable tax treatment
of a partnership is by use of a corporation as the sole general partner.
In early attempts at the use of this device the corporation was generally
organized with a nominal amount of capital and its sole purpose was to
serve as the general partner. In the event that the investments of the
limited partnership became unprofitable, the creditors of the limited
partnership would have recourse only against the "dummy" corpora-
tion. In reality, no one was liable for the debts of the limited partner-
ship. Because of such abuses, the Service formulated informal guidelines
several years ago establishing minimum capitalization requirements for
43Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1960).
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1960).
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the corporate general partner." The Service indicated that it would rule
that a limited partnership was subject to corporation taxation when the
sole general partner was a corporation unless (1) the limited partners
did not own directly 'or indirectly more than twenty percent of the stock
of the corporate general partner and (2) the corporate general partner
maintained a net worth equal to fifteen percent of partnership capital
in cases in which such capital was less than 2.5 million dollars, or ten
percent of the total partnership capital in cases in which the capital
exceeds 2.5 million dollars. 7
In response to an increasing number of ruling requests and the need
for clarification in this area, the Internal Revenue Service in January,
1972 issued Revenue Procedure 72-13,18 formally setting forth what had
been the informal ruling policy of the Service in past years. Because of
the increased use of corporate general partners and the importance of
falling within the guidelines of Revenue Procedure 72-13, this procedure
should be examined carefully.
The revenue procedure provides that the Service will consider a
request for a ruling on the classification of an organization as a partner-
ship when the sole general partner is a corporation under the following
circumstances:
(1) The limited partners will not own directly or indirectly more than
twenty percent of the stock of the corporate general partner or an
affiliate corporation. For purposes of determining stock ownership, the
attribution rules of section 318 of the Code are applicable.
(2) The purchase of a limited partner's interest does not entail either
a mandatory or discretionary purchase of any type of security of the
corporate general partner or its affiliates.
(3) The net worth of the corporate general partner, computed on the
basis of the current fair market value of the corporation's assets, is at
all times equal to at least fifteen percent of the total contributions
made to the partnership by the partners (both general and limited)
where such total is less than 2,500,000 dollars, and ten percent of such
contributions where in excess of 2,500,000 dollars. In computing the
corporate general partner's net worth, its interest in the limited part-
"See, e.g., 25 TAX LAWYER 179 (1971); MORTGAGE & REAL ESTATE EXECUTIvEs REP., Oct.
30, 1970, at 2.
"125 TAX LAWYER 179 (1971).
191972 INT. REv. BULL. No. 2, at 26. For a recent discussion of Rev. Proc. 72-13 see Weiler,




nership and accounts and notes receivable from the limited partners is
excluded.49
It should first be pointed out that Revenue Procedure 72-13 does
not have the effect of disqualifying all limited partnerships with corpo-
rate general partners from partnership tax treatment when the corporate
general partner does not meet the criteria set forth. Rather, the proce-
dure sets forth certain criteria which, under normal circumstances, must
be met if a favorable tax ruling is to be issued. In addition, the procedure
will not be applied when a limited partnership has, in addition to a
corporate general partner, an individual general partner, though for
ruling purposes the Service will most likely require proof of financial
worth of the individual general partner." Apparently, an advance ruling
could be obtained on the status of a limited partnership in an appropri-
ate fact situation even if the net worth, stock ownership, and other
conditions in Revenue Procedure 72-13 are not met. It would be ex-
pected, however, that the time involved in securing such a ruling would
be greater than if the conditions set forth in the ruling were met. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that the failure of the Service to issue a
favorable ruling does not mean the organization will be taxed as an
association.
Although the procedure does not so state, in order to obtain a
favorable ruling the limited partnership apparently must not only meet
the requirements of the procedure, it must also have not more than two
of the four relevant corporate characteristics as interpreted by the regu-
lations.
The net worth requirements of Revenue Procedure 72-13 will prob-
ably be the most troublesome aspect of the Service's announced posi-
tion. Under the procedure the corporate general partner must at all
times meet the net worth requirements computed on the basis of the
current fair market value of the corporation's assets. Thus the limited
partnership, even after receipt of an initially favorable ruling from the
Service, always runs the risk of subsequent disqualification should the
net worth of the corporate general partner drop below the required
minimum. The fact that the net worth requirement is based upon fair
market value may create serious problems in valuation. Furthermore,
'1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2.
OIt is understood that in connection with several recent private ruling requests a statement of
the net worth of the individual general partner has been required. The apparent basis is Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1965).
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should a revenue agent, on audit, disagree with the corporation's own
valuation of its assets or an appraiser's valuation, the limited partner-
ship may well have to shoulder the burden of proving the worth of its
corporate general partner.
The net worth percentage required by the procedure is applied to
the "total contributions" to the limited partnership rather than to the
value of the partnership.5 Presumably, "contributions" has the same
meaning as this term is used to determine contributions to partnership
capital generally under Subchapter K.52
The procedure is unclear whether a binding obligation of the lim-
ited partners to contribute additional capital in specified amounts is to
be considered a "contribution" for purposes of applying the net worth
test. If there is, in fact, a binding commitment, it would appear that the
corporate general partner would be required to base its net worth upon
capital committed or subscribed for as well as the actually paid-in
contributions. Logically, contingent commitments should be excluded.
To the extent that the capital contributions of the limited partnership
are reduced by reason of losses incurred by the partnership and taken
as deductions by the partners, it is generally thought that the net worth
requirements will be geared to the total contributions to the limited
partnership without reduction.
When the corporate general partner has interests in more than one
limited partnership, the procedure concludes that the net worth require-
ment must at least be as great his the sum of the net worth requirements
set forth in the procedure for each of the separate limited partner-
ships.53 In addition, the corporation's interests in each of the other
limited partnerships are excluded in computing the net worth of the
corporate general partner in each limited partnership. The literal lan-
guage of the revenue procedure excludes the corporate general partner's
interest as a general partner and its interest as a limited partner in any
other limited partnership in computing the net worth. The basic purpose
of the net worth test is to ensure the existence of a general partner, in
substance as well as in form, that has assets sufficient to satisfy the
partnership's obligations. In effect, the regulations require the numeri-
cal equivalent for corporations of the requirement for individual general
"tRev. Proc. 72-13, § 2.02, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 27.
"See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 721-22.
-Rev. Proc. 72-13, § 2.03, 1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 2, at 27.
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partners-that they not be judgment-proof and have a substantial
worth.
The twenty percent limit on direct and indirect ownership54 in the
corporate general partner by the limited partners must also be- carefully
monitored. The broad attribution rules of section 318 of the Code,
which are applicable, could easily cause an unknown violation. The
procedure is not, however, clear as to whether the "stock" referred to
in the procedure is to be limited to voting stock or whether it encompas-
ses any and all types of equity-type securities, such as nonvoting com-
mon stock, preferred stock, or convertible debt. Caution would dictate
giving this requirement a wide berth by taking appropriate steps to
ensure that the limited partners can in no circumstances be considered
to own more than twenty percent of all classes of securities combined.5
The developer who wishes to serve as the corporate general partner
may be unable to meet the net worth requirements because of particu-
larly large liabilities and problems in valuing existing assets. The latter
is a common occurrence for a real estate developer. In such a case,
consideration should be given to the formation of a subsidiary corpora-
tion that could be capitalized with sufficient cash to meet the net worth
requirement. The cash paid into the subsidiary could be retained in a
certificate of deposit during the life of the limited partnership, and the
net worth tests of the procedure would be met at all times. The devel-
oper's financial position would not be adversely affected since a consoli-
dated financial statement would incorporate the net worth of the subsid-
iary general partner. 6 Under the literal language of the procedure this
method would appear to be permissible. Furthermore, the funds re-
tained in the separate entity would in fact be available to the general
creditors of the limited partnership, and the basic purpose of the net
worth requirements of Revenue Procedure 72-13 will have been satis-
fied.57
51Presumably the prohibition upon the twenty percent ownership by the limited partners is to
guard against the possibility of a sham partnership. This could result when a group of individuals
organized a corporation to serve as the corporate general partner, owned all of the stock of the
corporate general partner, and were in turn all of the limited partners of the limited partnership.
6The possibility of application of the thin incorporation doctrine to the corporate general
partner could produce some interesting results. Conceivably, the Service could take the position
that loans from limited partners to the corporate general partner constituted a so-called second
class of stock and, if the debt were large enough, the twenty percent rule could be violated.
6It is understood that some private rulings have been issued approving the use of a subsidiary
corporation as the sole corporate general partner.
"For a comprehensive discussion of the partnership corporation problem see Driscoll, The
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BASIC PROBLEMS
In a highly leveraged real-estate limited partnership, the antici-
pated losses during the initial years of operation will exceed the capital
contributed by the limited-partner investors. In order for the limited
partners to realize the full benefits of their investment, it is necessary
that these losses be available to offset or shelter other income. The Code
provides that a partner whether general partner or limited partner, may
not deduct losses to the extent that the same exceed basis in the partner-
ship."8 No problem is encountered with a general partnership since each
of the general partners are liable for all partnership debt and are there-
fore entitled to increase their basis in the partnership by their pro rata
share of debt. 9 In the case of a limited partnership, however, the regula-
tions provide that a limited partner's share of partnership liabilities for
purposes of determining basis in the partnership may not exceed the
difference between his actual contribution credited to him by the part-
nership and the total contribution which he is obligated to make under
the limited partnership agreement.10 Accordingly, under normal circum-
stances the limited partners would be entitled to deduct losses of the
partnership only up to their basis in the partnership. Section 1.752-1(e)
of the regulations, however, contains an important exception:
[W]here none of the partners have any personal liability with respect
to a partnership liability (as in the case of a mortgage on real estate
acquired by the partnership without the assumption by the partnership
or any of the partners of any liability on the mortgage), then all part-
ners, including limited partners, shall be considered as sharing such
liability . . . in the same proportion as they share the profits.
Thus, in the situation in which no partner, either the general partners
or any of the limited partners, is personally liable on a particular debt
of the limited partnership, each partner is entitled to include a portion
of the debt in such partner's basis as determined by the ratio of his share
of the profits.
The availability of nonrecourse or no-liability financing has in-
Association Problem in Joint Ventures and Limited Partnerships, N.Y.U. 17Tm INST. ON FED.
TAx. 1067 (1959). Fox, The Maximum Scope of the Association Concept, 25 TAX. L. REV. 311
(1970).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704 (d); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(1) (1956). See also Curtis W.
Kingbay, 46 T.C. 147 (1966).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 752(a).
IDTreas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). *
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creased in recent years, and FHA mortgages and conventional lenders
now frequently grant exculpatory clauses in mortgages on apartments
and office buildings. A purchase-money mortgage in North Carolina or
the acquisition of property "subject to" an existing mortgage will also
qualify under the regulations.6'
In those situations in which no-liability financing is not available
to the limited partnership, only the general partner will be liable on the
partnership debt and entitled to include such liability in his basis. Simi-
larly, if a limited partnership assumes a liability so that the general
partner becomes personally liable, only the general partner's basis
would be increased by the amount of such liability. Consider the situa-
tion in which the limited partnership secures financing of which the
general partner must guarantee twenty-five percent of the indebtedness
with the balance being without recourse. It can be argued that since
seventy-five percent of the face amount of the loan is without liability,
that portion should be added to the limited partners' basis. However,
the regulations speak of debt with respect to which "none of the partners
have any personal liability. '6 2 Since the general partner has part liabil-
ity, the debt probably will not qualify. However, if the general partner
should subsequently be released from liability, the debt should then be
available to increase the limited partner's basis pro rata.
It has been suggested that the insufficient basis problem can be
overcome by providing in the limited partnership agreement that each
of the limited partners will be obligated to the limited partnership for a
specific dollar amount (the amount of the anticipated basis deficit), but
that such indebtedness will be payable only at the time the partnership
does not have sufficient funds to make the payments on its permanent
financing or other mortgage indebtedness. Since this liability would
exist in favor of the partnership it would appear that this would offer a
possible solution. However, it is quite possible that such an obligation
in many instances would be viewed with some hesitation by the limited
partners.
It has also been thought that an agreement between the general
partner and the limited partners under which the limited partners agree
"In the case of a "purchase money mortgage" the seller-mortgagee has recourse only against
the property and not against the purchaser-mortgagor. This should satisfy the "no liability"
requirement of the Regulations. Similarly, when real property is acquired "subject to" a mortgage
(as opposed to assuming a mortgage), no liability exists as to the purchaser. Again, the "no
liability" test of the Regulations should be satisfied.
6rrreas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
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to indemnify and hold harmless the general partner for any payments
exceeding his pro rata share of the liabilities of the partnership should
be sufficient to increase the basis of the limited partners. However, the
Internal Revenue Service has ruled to the contrary. 3
Two recent rulings present interesting interpretations of the effect
of nonrecourse loans on basis. In many gas and oil limited partnerships,
as well as some involving real property, the general partner will make
personal loans to the limited partnership on a nonrecourse basis in an
attempt to induce investors to participate in the project. Repayment of
the loans presumably would come out of the cash flow or tax savings
inuring to the benefit of the limited partners. In Revenue Ruling 72-
1354 the Service held that a nonrecourse loan from a general partner
to the partnership or limited partners actually constitutes an equity
investment by the general partner and cannot create basis for the limited
partners. In a subsequent ruling, Revenue Ruling 72-350,15 the Service
expanded on this doctrine and held that an inadequately secured loan,
made on a nonrecourse basis to the partnership, does not create basis
to the limited partners. The rationale of Revenue Ruling 72-350 would
seem highly questionable. While obligations with no personal liability
may be challengeable on the grounds of no bona fide debt, the conclu-
sion under the regulations and existing case law seems to be clear that
such nonliability-type obligations in fact increase basis."
Should a situation arise in which the limited partners are unable
to increase their basis sufficiently to utilize all losses, the question arises
as to when and by whom this loss is taken. Section 1.704-1(d)(1) of the
regulations provides that a partner's share of losses in excess of his basis
will be allowed in any future year when his basis has been increased in
an amount sufficient to absorb the loss. If the limited partnership con-
6Rev. Rul. 69-223, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 184.
"1972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 13, at 16.
611972 INT. REV. BULL. No. 30, at 8.
cSee Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), where in the case of a 99-year no-liability
purchase money mortgage (which exceeded the basis of the particular property by $300,000) the
government sought to exclude the mortgage from the depreciable basis on the theory that no
obligation to pay was created because of the absence of a personal liability. The Tax Court,
however, ruled in favor of the taxpayer. The Mayerson case was acquiesced in by the Service in
Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 59, but with the caveat that it was only as to the particular
facts and circumstances of that case. In view of the Service's litigating position in the Mayerson
case, and the approach taken in Rev. Rul. 69-77 it is possible that a nonrecourse loan considerably
in excess of the basis of the property may be attacked by the Service in an attempt to exclude the
same from the partners' basis. See also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
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tinues without any increased capital contribution by the limited partner
and eventually is liquidated, the logical result under the regulations
would be that the general partner would be entitled to the losses unused
by the limited partners. 7
Partnerships that have so-called sub-partners or sub-ventures raise
a special basis problem. In an effort to avoid local securities laws, many
limited partnerships are organized with a small number of limited part-
ners who in turn sell or sub-venture their interests in capital and profits
to others. A sub-partner's ability to deduct partnership losses is limited
to his basis. It is not clear from the regulations under section 752 of the
Code whether members of sub-partnerships include a proportionate
share of the prime partnership's nonrecourse liability in their basis. A
private ruling issued to the National Housing Partnership Corporation 8
indicated that the sub-partnership is deemed to have a proportionate
share of the prime partnership's liabilities, and it follows logically that
the sub-venturers may include a proportionate share in their basis.
SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS
One of the principal advantages to operating in partnership or
limited partnership form is the considerable flexibility available in allo-
cating items of income or loss disproportionately among the partners.6 9
In an effort to make a particular real estate investment attractive
to the limited partners and to reduce the limited partners' risks to the
greatest extent possible, special allocations of cash flow, losses, or par-
ticular items of losses such as depreciation and interest deductions may
be made to the limited partners during the construction period and the
initial years of operation of the project when tax losses are most likely
to be the greatest. Through use of special allocations the limited part-
ners will be able to recover a large portion of their investment through
tax saving during the initial years of the partnership.
The most common allocation seen in the syndicated limited part-
nership is an allocation of all losses (or possibly all depreciation) of the
limited partnership to the limited partners for a specified number of
years or until such time as the total amount of the losses allocated to
"Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
"'The private ruling is a public document on file in the office of the Securities and Exchange
Commission as an exhibit to the National Housing Corporation's registration statement. The
ruling is reprinted in PLI, JOINT VENTURES IN REAL ESTATE 461 (Real Estate Series Vol. 26, 1970).
"'See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(a).
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the limited partners is equal to twice the capital contributions of the
limited partners. Using such an allocation, the limited partners in the
fifty percent tax bracket would have recovered their entire investment
through tax savings.
Section 704(a) of the Code provides that a partner's distributive
share of income, gain, loss deduction, or credit is determined by the
partnership agreement, except as otherwise provided by section 704.
Section 704(b) of the Code provides that a partner's distributive share
of any item of income, gain, loss deduction, or credit shall also be
determined in accordance with his distributive share of taxable income
or loss, unless the partnership agreement provides otherwise with re-
spect to particular items or unless the principal purpose of any provision
in the partnership agreement with respect to allocation of any particular
item is the avoidance or evasion of tax.
Section 1.704-1(b)(2) of the regulations sets forth considerations
which are deemed to be relevant in determining whether or not a partic-
ular allocation is for the purpose of avoidance or evasion of federal
income taxes: whether the partnership or a partner individually has a
business purpose for the allocation; whether the allocation has "substan-
tial economic effect"; whether related items of income, gain, loss deduc-
tion, or credit from the same source are subject to the same allocation;
whether the allocation was made without recognition of normal business
factors and only after the amount of the specially allocated item could
reasonably be estimated; the duration of the allocation, and the overall
tax consequences of the allocation.
The Senate Finance Committee Report dealing with section 70470
of the Code indicated that a special allocation of certain items would
be recognized if the allocation had substantial economic effects. While
the regulations list six criteria to be examined and weighed in each case
involving a special allocation, the Tax Court has adopted a view similar
to the Senate Finance Committee and has concluded that the presence
of a "substantial economic effect" is the primary criterion for the recog-
nition of a special allocation."
A literal reading of sections 704(a) and 704(b) would seem to indi-
cate that the two provisions have different application. While section
704(a) appears to allow unlimited latitude in the allocation of income
and loss among the partners, section 704(b) imposes restrictions on the
70S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
"
tStanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970).
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allocation of individual items of income or loss such as interest, depre-
ciation, etc.
It can be argued that under the provisions of section 704(a) the
partnership agreement can provide for any allocation of taxable income
or loss, commonly referred to as "bottom line" allocations, (as opposed
to an item of income or loss, such as depreciation) to the partners
without regard to the economic effect of such allocation. 72 However, two
recent Tax Court decisions, 73 one involving an attempted allocation of
income and loss and the other involving an attempted allocation of items
and the provisions of section 704(b) cast doubt on this conclusion.
In Stanley C. Orrisch74 two partners owned two apartment projects.
Under an oral partnership agreement they agreed to share equally the
profits and losses from the venture, which was done for the first three
years. In the fourth year the partners agreed that thereafter all deprecia-
tion would be allocated to partner B but that gain or loss from the
partnership business, computed without regard to depreciation, would
be divided equally. It was further agreed that if the property were subse-
quently sold at a profit, the specially allocated depreciation would be
"charged back" to partner B's capital account and partner B would pay
the tax on the gain attributable thereto. The modification of the original
partnership agreement was also oral.
The Tax Court in Orrisch concluded that the principal purpose of
the special allocation of all the depreciation deduction to the one partner
was the avoidance of income tax and was therefore prohibited under the
express provisions of section 704(b). In reaching this conclusion, the
court relied heavily upon the report of the Senate Finance Committee
accompanying the bill finally enacted as the 1954 Code and the refer-
ence in this report to the need of "substantial economic effect." The
petitioners in Orrisch argued that the allocation had substantial eco-
nomic effect in that it was reflected in the capital accounts of the part-
ners. The regulations provide that an allocation has economic effect if
it "may actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the
"See Koff, Partnerships and the Special Allocation: The Winds of Change, 50 TAXES 5 (1972);
Long, Tax shelters in real estate partnership: An analysis of tax hazards that still exist, 36 J. TAX.
312, 315 (1972); McGuire, When will a special allocation of deductions among partners be
recognized?, 37 J. TAX. 74, 75 (1972).
"Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395 (1970); Jean v. Kresser, 54 T.C. 1621 (1970).
755 T.C. 395 (1970).
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total partnership income or loss independently of tax consequences
. . . . The court concluded that the agreement in Orrisch did not
meet this test. The agreement, the court said, in effect resulted only in
offsetting tax consequences, the relinquishment of a current deprecia-
tion deduction by partner A in exchange for the exoneration from all
or part of the capital gain tax when the property is sold. The court then
indicated that to find any economic effect to the special allocation
agreement apart from the tax consequences, it was necessary to deter-
mine who was to bear the economic burden of the depreciation if the
building should be sold at a loss. The court concluded that the partners
contemplated an equal division of the partnership assets upon dissolu-
tion with adjustment only for disparities in cash contributions or with-
drawals. Thus, the special allocation did not actually affect the dollar
amount of the partners' share of the total partnership income or loss
independently of tax consequences.
While Orrisch involved an attempt to allocate an individual item
of partnership income or loss (that is, depreciation) the Jean v. Kresser
case,76 also decided in 1970, involved an attempt to allocate the total
income of the partnership to a single partner. In Kresser an oral modifi-
cation of an oral partnership agreement allocated all of the taxable
income of the partnership to one partner, who had a net operating loss
that was about to expire. The taxable income so allocated was to be
restored to the other partners in future years. In holding against the
taxpayer's special allocation, the Tax Court stated:
It is quite true, as petitioners contend, that the partners may readjust
their respective partnership shares of income and that, apart from the
provisions of section 704(b)(2), effect will be given to the partners'
agreement and their modifications thereof. . . . Moreover while one
of the purposes of the statute was to provide flexibility to a certain
extent . . . that would enable the partners to shift their tax burdens
. . . the modifications contemplated must at least be bona fide. Thus,
although the partners are to be permitted to readjust their distributive
shares inter sese, such readjustments must be real, and we are therefore
faced with the threshold question on this issue as to whether there was
any genuine readjustment of the partners' distributive shares. In our
view of the record the evidence indicates the contrary and certainly
does not establish that there was any such bona fide reallocation."
75Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2) (1956).
7654 T.C. 1621 (1970).
7id. at 1630-3 1.
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The Kresser case is interesting in that it seems to avoid the question of
whether or not an allocation of taxable income or loss under section
704(a) is granted the seemingly unlimited latitude which the literal lan-
guage of section 704(a) provides. In effect, Kresser simply said there was
no modification of the partnership agreement. In addition, the court, in
a footnote, specifically disclaimed any attempt to pass upon the Serv-
ice's argument that section 704(b)(2)-the tax avoidance or tax evasion
prohibition-was applicable to the particular facts of this case. In this
footnote the Tax Court stated:
While we are fully prepared to accept the contention that the principal
purpose of the alleged modifications was the 'avoidance or evasion' of
tax on Appleton within the meaning of sec. 704(b)(2), we are faced with
the petitioners' troublesome argument that sec. 704(b)(2) applies only
to 'items' of income, etc., dealt with in pars. (1) through (8) of sec.
702(a) and does not govern par. (9) relating to the composite of all of
the partnership's income (sometimes referred to as its 'ordinary in-
come') which is here involved. The point is not without difficulty.
Although there is general language in Smith v. Commissioner, 331
F.2d 299, 301 (C.A. 7), in accord with the Government's argument,
the structure of the statute itself and language in the legislative history
should seem to give support to petitioners' position. See S. Rept. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 379. However, in view of our conclusion
that there was not in fact a bona fide realloccation of income among
the partners, we do not reach the question whether sec. 704(b)(2) is
applicable to sec. 702(a)(9).78
The footnote in Kresser offers a strong argument in support of the
position that section 704(a) provides greater latitude on the allocation
of income and losses, as opposed to allocation of items of income and
losses under section 704(b). However, the later Orrisch decision and the
emphasis placed by the Tax Court on the importance of economic effect
cannot be ignored. Consequently, until the Service or the courts offer
further clarification it would appear necessary to recognize a possible
application of the Orrisch standard before providing for special alloca-
tions and to structure the proposed allocations in such a way that the
substantial economic effect can be demonstrated.71 Caution would fur-
'11d. at 1631 n.5.
9An example of a special allocation which was upheld is set forth in Rev. Rul. 66-187, 1966-
2 Cu I. BULL. 246 (1966). There, one partner's capital contribution consisted of municipal bonds
and the agreement among the partners provided that the interest earned on those bonds was to be
credited specially to his account. The Service concluded that the transaction had substantial eco-
nomic effect and was therefore permissible.
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ther dictate that the partnership agreement take a less aggressive posi-
tion with respect to special allocations in an effort possibly to avoid an
unwanted audit of a partnership return. 0
A special allocation of profits or losses will also affect the basis of
the partners receiving such special allocations to the extent that such
basis is the result of nonrecourse liability. For example, assume a part-
nership composed of A and B, in which seventy-five percent of the
profits were allocated to A and twenty-five per cent to B during the first
five years, and fifty percent to each partner thereafter. The partnership
has actual capital contributions of 10,000 dollars from each partner and
has nonrecourse debt of one million dollars. If the partnership agree-
ment is drawn so that the special allocation is upheld, during the first
five years of the partnership's existence partner A will have a basis equal
to his original capital contribution of 10,000 dollars plus seventy-five
percent of the nonrecourse debt, or an additional 750,000 dollars. Logic
would further dictate that there would be a readjustment of basis begin-
ning with the sixth year. Query, however, what would be the effect upon
the individual partners if, after the expiration of five years, partner A's
share of the partnership's losses for the five year period equals 760,000
dollars? Beginning with the sixth year A would have deducted 250,000
dollars more than his basis in the sixth year but exactly equal to his basis
in the fifth year. It would appear under section 752 and section 1.752-
l(a) of the regulations that in the sixth year A would be treated as
having received a taxable distribution to the extent of the 250,000 dol-
lars.
In drafting any limited partnership agreement, the prudent drafts-
man should project the actual economic effect of any special allocations
and any basis adjustments and should include in these projections not
only the first few years of operation, but also an ultimate sale, both at
a loss and at a profit, in order to determine whether the special alloca-
01n many instances some nontax significance to the allocation can be created so as to give
substantial economic effect to the allocation. For example, assume A and B each own fifty percent
of a partnership which has a depreciation deduction of 100,000 dollars, and it is desired that the
entire 100,000 dollars of depreciation be allocated to A. This arrangement would appear to be
acceptable to the Service if A is also chargeable under the partnership agreement with the first
100,000 dollars of actual cash loss, if any, upon the sale of the real estate, and is likewise allocated
the first 100,000 dollars of capital gains (or depreciation recapture) if it is sold as a profit. This
would seem to give economic effect to the allocation and would satisfy the provisions of the
Regulations. In most cases the likelihood of A actually losing money on such an investment would




tions will accomplish their intended purpose, and to verify the presence
of economic substance to the allocation.81
FURTHER PROBLEM AREAS
There are other problems that can be encountered by investors or
developers in the organization and operation of the real estate limited
partnership. While these matters are of lesser importance they do arise
frequently and should not be overlooked.
Syndicator's Fees. It is quite common for the syndicator or pro-
moter of a real estate tax shelter to receive an interest in the earnings
and profits of the partnership as his fee for selling the limited partner-
ship interests to investors. This has long been viewed as a nontaxable
transaction since such an interest in earnings was considered incapable
of present valuation.82 This position finds some support in section 721
of the Code and the regulations issued thereunder. 3 It should be noted,
however, that it is clear that if the promoter receives a capital interest
in the partnership (that is a capital account), the interest is immediately
subject to taxation. 4 The recent case of Sol Diamond85 casts doubt on
the nontaxability of an earnings interest received by a promoter. In
Diamond the taxpayer received an interest in the profits for services
performed by him in arranging financing for the purchase of real prop-
erty. Three weeks later he sold his interest in the partnership and
claimed a short-term capital gain. The court held that the promoter
received taxable income when he received his profit interest even though
the taxpayer did not receive a capital interest. The court rejected the
"For a complete discussion of the question of special allocations from a balance sheet stand-
point see McGuire, supra note 72.
2See Nassau, Tax Considerations In Writing a Partnership Agreement: Suggested Clauses,
N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 125, 129 (1968); Rabinowitz, Realty syndication: An income
tax primer for investor and promoter, 29 J. TAx. 92, 98 (1968); cf United States v. Frazell, 335
F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 339 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961
(1965).
1Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956) covers the situation in which a partnership interest is
received for services and makes the following distinction between a capital interest in the partner-
ship and an interest in the profits: "To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his
right to be repaid his contribution (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor
of another partner as compensation for services . . . section 721 does not apply." (emphasis
added.)
"See United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 339 F.2d 885 (5th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965); Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956).
-56 T.C. 530 (1971).
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taxpayer's argument that under the regulations the receipt of an interest
in partnership profits is subject to taxation only upon receipt of partner-
ship income:
Relying upon these provisions [Treas. Reg. 1.721-1(b)(1) (1956)],
petitioners contend that when a taxpayer receives a partnership interest
as compensation for services he is required to account for that interest
at once as ordinary income if he acquires an interest in partnership
capital, but not if he receives only the right to share in the partnership's
future profits and losses. It is true that the regulations make section
721 inapplicable in the case of a taxpayer who has received an interest
in the capital contribution made by another partner . . . . But the
effect of the first parenthetical clause in the second sentence of these
regulations, (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits),
upon which petitioners place their sole reliance, is obscure. Certainly,
unless section 721 of the Code grants the relief which petitioners seek,
they are left subject to section 61. Yet nothing in the foregoing regula-
tions explicitly states that a partner who has received a partnership
interest like the one before us in exchange for services already per-
formed comes within the provisions of section 721. The parenthetical
language does not so state. At most, it excludes that type of situation
from the rule which the regulations affirmatively set forth in respect
of readjustments of capital interests, but it does not deal one way or
the other with situations described in the parenthetical clause."
The effect of Diamond as a precedent is unclear, because of its particu-
lar facts and because there was an element of "assignment of income"
present. Apparently, the result of that case would have been avoided if
the interest received by the promoter had not been solely for services
rendered in connection with originally promoting the transaction, but
had been for management services that were to be performed during the
subsequent operation of the project."7
Transfer of Property to the Partnership. Gain or loss is normally
not recognized by the partnership or any individual partner on the con-
tribution of property to a partnership.88 Any proposed transfer of mort-
"Id. at 545-46. See also Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1), 36 Fed. Reg. 10799 (1972).
"For a good discussion of the promoter's fee see Ben-Horin, Real Estate Syndications, Lin-
ited Partnerships, U. So. CAL. 1972 TAx INST. 71, 82-91.
gINT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 721. Under sections 1245(b)(3) and 1250(b)(3) of the Code no
depreciation recapture takes place upon the transfer. In additiQn, under § 722 of the Code an
individual's basis in the partnership is equal to his basis in the property which he contributed to
the partnership. If the property transferred to the partnership entails substantially unrealized
appreciation, then under § 704(c)(2) of the Code and Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) (1956) gain upon
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gaged property to a partnership should, however, be examined carefully.
Note the following possibility: Investor A transfers land worth two
million dollars to a limited partnership subject to a mortgage liability
of one million dollars in exchange for a fifty percent interest as a limited
partner. A's basis in the land is 200,000 dollars. The mortgage indebted-
ness of one million dollars is assumed by the partnership. The transfer
of the property to the limited partnership produces no gain to A and
his basis for the land becomes the basis for his limited partnership
interest."' However, the liability assumed by the limited partnership is
treated the same as a distribution by the partnership of cash to A under
section 752(b) of the Code. 0 The constructive distribution reduces A's
basis for his partnership interest,9 and gain is recognized to the extent
the distribution exceeds A's basis. In the example above, A's basis was
200,000 dollars and the liability assumed was one million dollars, resu-
lting in recognizable gain of 800,000 dollars.92 In addition, since the
partnership assumed A's obligation, A as a limited partner would not
be entitled to include any portion of the mortgage in his basis for his
partnership interest. Had the partnership acquired the property subject
to the mortgage instead of assuming A's liability so that no personal
liability would exist, A would not have been required to recognize gain
at the time of the contribution.93
Depreciation. The successful real estate tax shelter is dependent
upon accelerated depreciation to a great extent. The Tax Reform Act
of 19691 imposed restrictions on accelerated depreciation. New residen-
tial properties, which would include apartment buildings, are still enti-
tled to use the double-declining-balance and sum-of-the-year-digits
methods, the most liberal of the depreciation methods." Owners of new
office buildings and like property are entitled to use a 150 percent
declining balance.9 However, owners of used residential property are
limited to a 125 percent declining balance or straightline depreciation,
a subsequent sale by the partnership directly attributable to such appreciation generally should be
allocated to the partner who contributed property.
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 721-22.
"Cf. Magnolia Dev. Corp., 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1032 (1960).
9tINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 733.
"See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 731(a)(1).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956).
'Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954).
"5INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(j)(2).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1670)(1).
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and owners of used nonresidential property, such as an office building,
are limited to straight-line depreciation. 7 New residential property will
therefore often generate a larger loss for tax purposes than other types
of property due to larger amounts of depreciation.
The availability of the accelerated method of depreciation is depen-
dent upon whether the property is "new." The Internal Revenue Service
takes the position that once an apartment unit or office building is
occupied by one tenant the property no longer qualifies as new but is
considered used property subject to the more restrictive depreciation
methods. The timing of the organization of the limited partnership and
its continuation as an entity are therefore extremely important if the
desired tax consequences are to be achieved.
Section 708(b)(1)(B) of the Code provides that if more than fifty
percent of the total interests in the capital and profits and losses of the
partnership is sold within a twelve month period, the partnership termi-
nates for tax purposes. Thereafter the venture will be considered as
being carried on by a new partnership. In the event that there should
be as much as fifty percent change in the partners in a given year the
partnership will no longer be able to use the accelerated methods of
depreciation. 8 The application of section 708 of the Code also would
appear to dictate that the limited partners be admitted to the limited
partnership prior to the date that the tenants occupy the premises. If
the partnership is formed, tenant occupancy commences, and then sub-
stantially all the limited partners are brought in as investors, it is quite
possible that the Internal Revenue Service would take the position that
the admission of a substantial number of limited partners after occu-
pancy in effect was a sale of an interest by the general partner. If more
than a fifty percent interest was deemed to be sold, then a new partner-
ship came into existence under section 708 (b)(1). This new partnership
would likewise be a new owner and would not be permitted to utilize
the accelerated depreciation methods.
Dealership Status. When the general partner or one of the limited
partners is a real estate developer, the problem of creating or imputing
dealership status from one partner to another or from one partnership
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 167(i).
8Note, however, that Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(l)(ii) (1956) indicates that the admission of
additional partners in exchange for capital contributions, even when the new partners receive an
interest in excess of fifty percent, will not result in a termination of the partnership since no sale
or exchange is deemed to be involved.
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to another partnership is raised. This is of great importance to the
investors since classification as a "dealer" in real estate eliminates capi-
tal gains treatment upon the ultimate sale of the partnership real es-
tate.9 In Riddell v. Scales,' the Ninth Circuit held that the intent of a
dealer who organized the venture to hold his interest for sale to custom-
ers could not be imputed to other venturers. Accordingly, it follows that
in determining dealer status, the purposes of the venture and the manner
in which the investor holds his interest is controlling and "dealer" status
will not be imputed. However, if the purpose of the venture is to develop
and subdivide the partnership property, the venture itself will be a dealer
and each partner's share of the income of the dealer-partnership will be
taxed as ordinary income even though the individual limited partners
are not dealers. 01
Guaranteed Payments. In the promotion of a limited partnership
tax shelter, care must be taken that no promises are made in presenting
projections of income or cash flow to the investors that could be con-
strued as guaranteed payment within the meaning of section 707(c) of
the Code. Under that section a partnership agreement may provide for
a guaranteed payment to one or more partners. These payments are
regarded as distributions of ordinary income and the partnership is
permitted an ordinary income deduction therefor.12 If promised or
guaranteed cash flow to the investors is treated as "guaranteed pay-
ments" within the meaning of section 707(c), the investors would be
subject to ordinary income tax rather than the anticipated nontaxable
cash flow distributions.
The Soft Dollar. In an effort to maximize investors' return promot-
ers of tax shelters often attempt to convert the limited partners' invest-
ment into so-called "soft dollars," that is, dollars which will be immedi-
ately deductible. The developer of the property is often concerned only
with total dollars received rather than the form in which the dollars are
paid. Consequently, it may be possible to classify a portion of the pur-
chase price as deductible expenditures. This may take the form of var-
ious types of interest payment (that is, points on mortgage loans and
construction interest), wrap-around mortgages" 3 (in which during the
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 1221(1)-(2).
'10406 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1969).
"'See also Barham v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Ga. 1969).
11Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(c) (1956). See also F.A. Falconer, 40 T.C. 1011 (1963); Rev. Rul. 180,
1969-1 CUM,. BULL. 183.
'See note 106 infra.
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construction stage a nonrecourse mortgage is given by the purchasing
limited partnership which in effect "wraps around" the existing con-
struction loan thus enabling the partnership to have large interest ex-
pense for years of construction), management fees, prepaid interest,,0 4
and rent-up"°' expenses. In any limited partnership the use of such ap-
proaches, though very beneficial from the investor standpoint, should
be carefully examined to make sure that they have economic signifi-
cance and independent business basis apart from tax savings. A drasti-
cally structured partnership will invariably come under scrutiny by the
Internal Revenue Service."0 '
DISPOSITION OF THE TAX SHELTER
Any analysis of a real estate tax shelter must consider the antici-
pated tax consequences of an ultimate disposition of the investment.
One of the objectives of each investor in the tax shelter is appreciation
of the property and the ultimate realization of capital gains. In all too
many cases investors fail fully to comprehend the tax effects of a dispo-
sition of the real estate and are shocked to learn that the anticipated
capital gains now take the form of substantial amounts of ordinary
income. While it is not always possible to avoid the gain, it is important
that the investor, at the time of his initial investment in the limited
partnership, be made aware of the potential tax consequences upon a
later disposition of the project.
As a general rule, the sale or exchange of a partnership interest will
produce capital gain or loss under section 741 of the Code. Similarly,
the sale of the partnership assets and dissolution of the partnership will
"'The use of prepaid interest has been a popular tax planning device in the tax-oriented
investment field. For many years the Service appeared to permit the prepayment of interest for as
many as five years in advance. I.T. 3740, 1945 CuM. BULL. 109. However, in Rev. Rul. 643, 1968-
2 Cum. BULL. 76, the Service reversed its position and indicated that a deduction for prepaid
interest will be considered as a material distortion of income if the interest is prepaid for a period
extending more than twelve months beyond the end of the current year. It should be noted that
under the ruling the prepayment of interest twelve months in advance is not granted absolute
immunity; the Service still reserves the right to disallow this deduction if, under the particular facts
and circumstances of the case, it is believed that a distortion of income will result.
" Expenses in advertising and promoting the project during the "rent-up" period may be a
part of the purchase price where the seller guarantees a minimum occupancy percentage. Since
these are deductible expenses the purchaser may wish to pay them direct and reduce the purchase
price accordingly.
" For a discussion on some of the techniques currently used including wrap-around mortgages,
see Nad, Financing Techniques and Problems: Wrap-Around Mortgages, Unusable Interest De-
ductions, and Interest Subsidy, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1107 (1971).
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also result in capital gain or loss. 10 7 While the basic rules are simple, the
actual appliation can lead to some surprising results to the uninformed
investor.
Either the sale of a partnership interest or the sale of assets by the
partnership followed by liquidation will result in a substantial gain to
the limited partner in most real estate ventures because of two factors:
(1) the treatment of partnership debt as a distribution;' and (2) the
effect of accelerated depreciation." 9
When partnership assets are being sold subject to an existing mort-
gage liability, including a nonrecourse liability, the amount of the mort-
gage liability is considered proceeds of sale and is therefore a part of
the gain."' Similarly, when a partner sells his interest, as opposed to the
partnership selling assets, the gain realized for tax purposes includes his
share of the partnership's mortgage liabilities.'' As a result, the sale of
a partnership interest for one dollar may result in a taxable gain of
100,000 dollars because of the partnership debt being assumed by the
purchaser. Accordingly, in determining the tax effect of a proposed sale
the debt structure of the limited partnership will be most important.
A real estate venture gains much of its tax advantages through the
use of accelerated depreciation. Developers, in projecting the financial
condition of the limited partnership over a number of years, have
learned that somewhere between the sixth and eighth year of the normal
apartment or office building project the partnership will begin to show
income for tax purposes. At that point in time the depreciation and
interest expenses have decreased to the point that the net operating
revenues exceed them. At this point the tax shelter is generally sold. The
anticipated capital gain is not always there, however. Under the depre-
ciation recapture provisions of section 1245 of the Code (applicable to
personal property, such as refrigerators, ranges, air conditioning units,
107INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 751. Note, however, that § 751 provides a provision analogous
to the collapsible corporation provisions of § 341 of the Code. Section 751 imposes ordinary
income treatment on the sale of a partnership interest in those situations in which the partnership
has either unrealized receivables or substantially appreciated property. Treas. Reg. § 1.751-1(d)(1)
(1956) in effect provides that where the fair market value of all inventory items exceeds 120 percent
of partnership adjusted basis and ten percent of the fair market value of partnership property other
than money, then the traisfer of the partnership interest will result in ordinary income. See, e.g.,
Freeland v. Commissioner, 393 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968).
'See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 752.
IOSee INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1245, 1250.
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1956).
'"Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d) (1956).
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and carpeting)" 2 and section 1250 of the Code (applicable to depreciable
real property),113 some or all of the gain on the sale that would other-
wise be taxed as a capital gain is converted into ordinary income.
Under the provisions of section 1250, as it existed prior to the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, if real property were held for twelve months or
less and were sold after December 31, 1963, the entire amount of post-
1963 depreciation claimed would have been recaptured as ordinary in-
come to the extent of the gain recognized. If the property were held for
more than twelve months but no more than twenty months, the entire
excess of accelerated depreciation over straight-line depreciation would
have been recaptured as ordinary income.' If the property were held
for more than twenty months but less than 120 months (ten years), the
excess of accelerated over straight-line depreciation would have been
recaptured, but the amount of such recapture would have been reduced
by a percentage that would be equal to one percent per month for every
month the property was held after twenty months. In no case could the
amount of recapture have exceeded the gain on the sale reduced by the
same percentage.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 revised the depreciation recapture
rules of section 1250. Whereas under the pre-1969 statute a ten-year
holding period would eliminate the ordinary gain resulting from recap-
ture, under the revised recapture rules a sixteen-year, eight-month (200-
month) holding period is required to eliminate recapture."' In the case
of nonresidential properties (such as an office building), the excess of
depreciation claimed over straight-line depreciation will be ordinary
income, and there is no longer a reducing percentage based upon years
of ownership."' In the case of residential real property (such as an
apartment) sold during the first one-hundred months, the entire excess
of depreciation claimed over straightline depreciation is recaptured as
ordinary income (but not in excess of the gain recognized). If the prop-
erty is sold during the second one hundred months, the amount of
recapture is reduced by a percentage equal to one percent a month for
each month after the first one hundred months."'
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1245(a)(3).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(c).
'"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a) (repealed 1969).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(l)(C)(iii).
"'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(l)(C)(v).
'"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C). Special rules are provided in the case of certain
government sponsored or subsidized housing projects. For example, an FHA-236 housing project
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The 1969 Act also provides transitional rules to take into account
depreciation deducted prior to and after December 31, 1969.118
While there are no clear-cut answers to avoiding the tax which
seems inevitable upon disposition and over which the limited partners
may have no control, there are some possibilities available. The partner-
ship can be incorporated at that point in time when the partnership
begins to show a profit for tax purposes. Ownership can then be retained
more easily over a number of years, after which the corporation could
be merged or sold, and the anticipated capital gains realized. " 9 This
solution is not without problems. While transfers to a corporation solely
in exchange for voting stock normally are tax-free under section 351 of
the Code, the existence of excessive debt in the partnership will cause
problems. 20 To the extent that the assets to be transferred to the corpo-
ration are subject to a liability that exceeds the owner's basis in the
property, section 357(c) of the Code requires that such excess be treated
as taxable "boot." The liabilities-in-excess-of-basis rules of section 357
of the Code will find frequent application in the incorporation of a tax-
oriented real estate investment because of the accelerated depreciation
methods so commonly used.
Another approach to solving the dilemma of the profitable partner-
ship is to refinance partnership projects when the partnership begins to
show a profit for tax purposes. Upon refinancing the partners would
generally be able to withdraw tax-free the mortgage funds in excess of
the principal balance owed on the indebtedness and to realize the bene-
fits of the appreciation in value of the project without present tax conse-
quences.12' In addition, the increased interest on the new mortgage may
have the effect of converting the profitable partnership into a deficit
operation, thus retaining its basic tax shelter characteristics.
is still subject to the old ten-year recapture rules instead of the extended 16-year 8-month rule.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C) (ii).
.. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a).
"'However, the collapsible corporation provisions of § 341 of the Code will have to be exam-
ined carefully to determine possible application.
'As to the possible ways in which assets can be transferred by the partnership to a corpora-
tion, and the tax effect of each method, see Rev. Rul. 239, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 74; Rosen, New
partnership incorporation ruling may create unforeseen problems in many areas, 33 J. TAx. 329
(1970).
"'The financing or refinancing does not involve a sale or exchange of partnership assets and
therefore does not give rise to a taxable event. The distribution of excess funds generated by the
refinancing to the extent not in excess of a partner's basis is likewise a nontaxable event at the
partner level.
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There are two other methods of disposing of depreciable property
by the limited partnership so that the depreciation recapture is deferred
and the owner's return is maximized. The conventional installment sale
of property with payments in the year of sale not exceeding thirty per-
cent of the selling price represents a relatively simple method of dispos-
ing of the depreciable property."' By utilizing the installment-sale ap-
proach, the investor group will not be saddled with an excessive tax
burden in any single year but will have the opportunity of spreading the
resulting gain over a period of years. In computing the projected results
of the installment sale, it should be noted that indebtedness on the
property is included in the sale price and constitutes a payment in the
year of sale to the extent that the indebtedness exceeds the basis.'
Thus, once again, the indebtedness of the partnership is extremely criti-
cal in determining the tax impact of the disposition method.
Section 1031 of the Code also offers a possible approach to the
disposition of the partnership's tax-oriented investment. In simplified
form, section 1031 provides that no gain or loss is recognized when
property held for investment is exchanged solely for property of a "like
kind" which is also to be held for investment. Under sections 1245(b)(3)
and 1250(d)(4) of the Code, no depreciation recapture is due upon the
exchange. The regulations under section 1031 describe "like kind" prop-
erty as having the same nature or character, and the illustrations in the
regulations indicate a liberal approach to the "like kind" determination.
For example, city real estate is treated as "like" a farm or ranch., The
principal problem with utilization of section 1031 is that if the exchange
of properties involves liabilities that follow the property, the transferor
is deemed to have received taxable "boot" in the amount of such liabili-
ties. 2 5 By treating the amount of any liabilities assumed in connection
with the exchange as money received, the usefulness of section 1031 to
the real estate limited partnership is severely restricted. However, this
particular provision of the Code should not be overlooked. For example,
it would appear that the problems arising because of partnership debt
may be avoided if the mortgage holder permits a substitution of the
newly acquired property for the old as security for the indebtedness.
...INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,-§§ 453-56. Under Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(d)(1) (1965), 1.1250-
l(b)(6) (1971), recapture income may be reported on the installment method.
"'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 752; Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(d).
"'Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1956).
"2Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2 (1956).
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During the past ten years there has been an increased effort by the
Internal Revenue Service and Congress to reduce the benefits of the
various forms of tax shelter investments. The adoption of the deprecia-
tion recapture rules applicable to personal property in 1962, followed
by the real property depreciation recapture rules in 1964, had only a
limited effect on the tax-oriented investment. However, the substantial
restrictions imposed on the use of accelerated depreciation methods and
the stricter depreciation recapture rules arising under the Tax Reform
Act of 1969 have unquestionably adversely affected tax-oriented real
estate investments.' It is difficult to say what the future holds, but it
would appear that some form of tax shelters in the real estate area will
continue to be desirable in spite of further anticipated action by Con-
gress to reduce the favorable tax treatment now available. With contin-
ued demands for housing, particularly in the area of low-income hous-
ing, it appears that Congress will continue to provide tax concession,
as evidenced by certain provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,127 in
order to induce private enterprise to invest funds in such ventures.
By giving careful attention to the structuring of the limited partner-
ship and by evaluating the potential tax effects of a sale of the property
in future years, high-income taxpayers can expect to continue to realize
substantial benefits from this type of investment.
"'For a discussion of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 and its impact on tax shelter investments
see Katcher, Tax-Sheltered Investments in Real Estate Under the 1969 Tax Reform Act, U. So.
CAL. 1971 TAX. INST. 587.
' 
2 See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(k), 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii).
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